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I.   INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court has a long tradition of protecting re-
ligious freedom in this country.1 Yet for those who are most anx-
ious about the separation of church and state, a dark specter has
begun to haunt America. Religious freedom and the First
Amendment principles2 that helped make this country great are
                                                                                                             
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University. B.A., University of Penn-
sylvania, 1955; J.D., Georgetown University, 1967. The author is indebted to George Bo-
ras and Sam Zietz for their research assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878) (“[T]o suffer the civil
magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or
propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which
at once destroys all religious liberty.”); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in . . . religion or other matters
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”) (emphasis added). See gen-
erally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that state could not deny employ-
ment benefits to plaintiff because she refused to work on Sabbath day of her faith); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Free Exercise Clause entitled Amish to
exemption from general school attendance law).
2. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The [First] Amendment’s purpose was not to strike merely at the official estab-
lishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation
such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was
to uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader than separating
church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and perma-
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being threatened.3 A hue and cry has arisen. The religious right
has repeatedly expressed its desire to make America a “Christian
nation.”4 A majority of American citizens now want to return
prayer to public schools.5
After the Republicans’ sweeping victory in the 1994 congres-
sional elections, “Religious Equality”6 and “Religious Liberties”7
amendments to the Constitution were introduced in the House of
                                                                                                             
nent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by com-
prehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963) (citation omitted).
Mr. Jefferson, in reply to an address to him by a committee of the Danbury
Baptist Association, took occasion to say: “Believing with you that religion is a
matter which lies solely between man and his God; that he owes account to
none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the gov-
ernment reach actions only, and not opinions,. . . I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their leg-
islature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between
church and state.”
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1820)). See also Stephanie E. Russell, Sorting
Through the Establishment Tests, Looking Past the Lemon, 60 MO. L. REV. 653, 658 n.43
(1995); 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281, 281-82 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed.,
1903).
3. See infra notes 6-7.
4. See Nat Hentoff, A Christian Nation?, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1996, at A25 (quoting
Focus on the Family founder Dr. James Dobson’s remark that “[t]he Constitution was de-
signed to perpetuate a Christian order”); Jann Rennert, Christian Soldiers March On-
ward, over Passive Electorate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 1995, at F1 (reporting that Chris-
tian Coalition conference attendees “were told they are ‘persecuted’ right here in their
‘Christian nation’ ”). Such sentiments are not limited to extremist elements. The Okla-
homa Republican Party adopted a platform at its 1996 convention declaring that the
United States was founded as a Christian nation and that all law should be based upon
Christian values. Tom Teepen, If Republicans Get Their Way, Pray for the Children,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 21, 1996, at 2F.
5. See Bill Broadway, Schism Over School Prayer: Two GOP-Proposed Constitutional
Amendments Reflect Split in Conservative Thinking, WASH. POST., Dec. 2, 1995, at B7.
6. H.R.J. Res. 121, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R. Ill.) intro-
duced the amendment on November 15, 1995. It provides: “Neither the United States nor
any State shall deny benefits to or otherwise discriminate against any private person or
group on account of religious expression, belief, or identity; nor shall the prohibition on
laws respecting an establishment of religion be construed to require such discrimination.”
Id. Rep. Hyde consulted with famed accommodationist Professor Michael McConnell to help
draft this new amendment, which would allow for government funding of religious organiza-
tions. Broadway, supra note 5, at B7.
7. H.R.J. Res. 127, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Rep. Ernest J. Istook, Jr. (R. Okla.)
introduced the amendment less than two weeks after the introduction of the Religious
Equality Amendment. The Religious Liberties Amendment provides:
To secure the people’s right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of
conscience: Nothing in this Constitution shall prohibit acknowledgments of the
religious heritage, beliefs, or traditions of the people, or prohibit student-
sponsored prayer in public schools. Neither the United States nor any State
shall compose any official prayer or compel joining in prayer, or discriminate
against religious expression or belief.
Id.
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Representatives. A number of commentators have viewed the
proposed amendments as a direct attack on the Establishment
Clause.8 Moreover, even though the traditional test of Establish-
ment Clause boundaries set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman 9 has proven more than adequate to maintain
the separation of church and state, several Supreme Court jus-
tices have advocated abolishing the test.10 Commentators such as
Professor Michael McConnell have written of the deserved death
of “secular liberalism.”11 Separation of church and state is under
siege. “Accommodation” is the new “correct” path.12
Not all of the roiling is unhealthy or improper by any means.
Buttressed by First Amendment rights of free exercise and free
speech, religion is still a powerful force in our cultural, political,
and social endeavors.13 This is appropriate for a country founded
upon the principle of religious liberty. History, however, remains
an omnipresent warning of potentially horrifying abuse.14 Free-
                                                                                                             
8. Constitutional scholars, including Douglas Laycock, have warned that the Religious
Equality Amendment is only a “ ‘school prayer’ amendment in disguise.” Janan Hanna,
Proposal Seeks ‘Religious Equality’; 1st Amendment Would Be Redefined, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
10, 1995, at C1. The Religious Liberties Amendment, on the other hand, shuns any such
disguise; its explicit goal is to restore prayer in schools. Katharine Q. Seelye, Proposed
Prayer Amendment Splits the Right, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at D18. A spokesman for
Americans United for Separation of Church and State has described the Religious Liber-
ties Amendment as “essentially repeal[ing] the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.”
Id.
9. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon laid out a three-part test: “First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’ ” Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). See generally
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
10. Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist have
all expressed dissatisfaction with the Lemon test. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (remarking that
“in many applications [the Lemon test] has been utterly meaningless”); County of Alle-
gheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Lemon test should not be Court’s
“primary guide” in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence); id. at 623 (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (preferring “endorsement test” over Lemon test); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that Lemon “has no basis in the history of
the amendment it seeks to interpret”). See also discussion infra part IV.
11. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115, 134 (1992) (“The ideology of secular liberalism, while still strong among the American
elite, has lost its position of unquestioned dominance.”).
12. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195,
203 (1992) (observing that while recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have tolerated some
official sponsorship of religion, “even this much accommodation of religion in public life is
not enough, however, for some members of the Court”).
13. Id. at 195-96; McConnell, supra note 11, at 134-35.
14. The Supreme Court has voiced the very same concern:
By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history shows that there
was a widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union
of Church and State. These people knew, some of them from bitter personal ex-
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dom of religion means freedom of conscience for all religions or
for none, not just freedom of conscience for the majority’s creed.15
The founders of this country were keenly aware of that.16 Thus,
the First Amendment mandates that “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.”17 Equilibrium is the key: as the right to
freely exercise one’s religion expands, the right to be free of an es-
tablished religion diminishes, and vice versa. Therein lies the
genius of the system; it allows religion to flourish while maintain-
ing a vibrant church-state separation that permits breathing
room for all. Historically, the Establishment Clause has been a
success.18
Many of the Establishment Clause cases decided by the Su-
preme Court during the past thirty years have been nibbles at
the margin of constitutional protection, not thrusts at the heart.19
The Rehnquist Court, by accentuating accommodation, has
shifted the fulcrum that balances the Free Exercise Clause with
the Establishment Clause.20 The seesaw now tilts decidedly in fa-
vor of the Free Exercise Clause, leaving the Establishment
Clause up in the air.21 The direction taken by the Court raises the
distant early warning of history’s tragic lessons.
                                                                                                             
perience, that one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to
worship in his own way lay in the Government’s placing its official stamp of
approval upon one particular . . . form of religious services.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962). In addition to obvious abuses, such as those
which took place in Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945 and during the Spanish Inquisition
in the late fifteenth century, the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina are a more recent example
of such horrors. See John F. Burns, 500 Muslims Driven by Serbs Through a Gauntlet of
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at A1.
15. “While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny
the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the ma-
chinery of the State to practice its beliefs.” Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
226 (1963).
16. “Our Founders were no more willing to let the content of their prayers and their
privilege of praying whenever they pleased be influenced by the ballot box than they were
to let these vital matters of personal conscience depend upon the succession of monarchs.”
Engel, 370 U.S. at 429.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. The Establishment Clause has been used to prevent many types of entanglements
between church and state. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (finding allo-
cation of state funds to religion-affiliated schools for secular subjects unconstitutional due
to excessive entanglement); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 (deciding that daily Bible reading
and reciting of the Lord’s Prayer in public schools is unconstitutional); Engel, 370 U.S. at
424 (holding official school prayer unconstitutional as a government-sponsored religious
activity).
19. Russell, supra note 2, at 659 n.45.
20. Id. at 660 n.53.
21. See Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2525 (1995);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center
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One of the central Establishment Clause issues has been the
need to ascertain the allowable proportion of religion in public
schools.22 Because children are susceptible to authority and may
not have the defenses necessary to screen out improper sugges-
tions, the Court has heard numerous cases that deal with this is-
sue.23 Part II of this Article examines the Rachel Bauchman
case.24 Currently on appeal in the Tenth Circuit, this case in-
volves the question of whether a fifteen-year-old Jewish girl’s Es-
tablishment Clause rights were violated by the use of overtly
Christian religious music and by the actions of the director of the
public school choir of which she was a member.25 Part III of this
Article analyzes significant Establishment Clause decisions in
the Warren and Burger Courts, exploring in particular the par-
entage and progeny of the Lemon test.26 Part IV analyzes notable
Establishment Clause opinions in the Rehnquist Court and illus-
trates how these decisions are systematically dismantling the
protection of the Establishment Clause. Part V articulates both a
response to the accommodationist trend of the Rehnquist Court
and a suggested answer to the Rachel Bauchman case. Finally,
part VI proposes a return to a rigorous application of the Lemon
                                                                                                             
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391 (1993); County of Allegheny v. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989).
22. The cases have ranged from activities that have entailed heavy involvement,
such as direct readings from the Bible, see Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223, and use of a state-
created school prayer, see Engel, 370 U.S. at 424, to activities with a lesser degree of in-
volvement. For example, in Lamb’s Chapel, the Court held that the use of public school
facilities to show a religious film was constitutional. 508 U.S. at 395. The Court also has
found unconstitutional the use of public funds to help build colleges and universities
with religious affiliations because such use did not primarily advance religion and had a
secular purpose. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762-66 (1976).
23. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595-97 (1992). The potential influence in a
school environment is much greater because of the amount of control faculty members and
administrators exert upon the students, as well as the ability to limit the movement of
students during religious exercises. Id. at 597. The Lee Court compared this to an invoca-
tion offered at the opening of a state legislative session, where the participants were adults
who were free to come and go with little comment. Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 792 (1983)).
24. See Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 906 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Utah
1995) (Bauchman III); Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254
(D. Utah 1995) (Bauchman II); Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F.
Supp. 248 (D. Utah 1995) (Bauchman I).
25. Bauchman II, 900 F. Supp. at 261.
26. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 10 (1947); see also Sease v. School District, 811 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa.
1993); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987);
Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980);
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test27 as the most suitable bright line for separating church and
state in public school cases.
II.   THE CASE OF RACHEL BAUCHMAN
In 1994, Rachel Bauchman, a fifteen-year-old Jewish girl,
transferred to West High School, a public school in Salt Lake
City, Utah.28 During the 1994-95 academic year, Rachel, a tenth-
grade honor student, auditioned for and became a member of the
school’s A’Cappella Choir, an elective course that the school of-
fered for credit.29 Rachel had been singing soprano in choruses
since the first grade and was thus familiar with a variety of cho-
ral music.30 This choir’s repertoire, however, which consisted
mainly of contemporary Christian devotionals, was quite differ-
ent from the repertoire of any of the choirs in which she had pre-
viously sung.31 Because of her religious convictions, Rachel did
not feel she could, in good conscience, sing these particular songs,
every one of which praised Jesus Christ.32 Nevertheless, the choir
class curriculum mandated that the choir practice and perform
these songs.33 As part of the curriculum, the choir director, Rich-
ard Torgerson, required Rachel and the other choir members to
sing at public sites.34 Many of these performances, especially the
ones that were part of a series of “Christmas concerts,” took place
in Christian churches.35 In addition, Torgerson’s former students
described him as a deeply religious man who pressed his religious
                                                                                                             
27. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
28. Bauchman I, 900 F. Supp. at 249-50 (D. Utah 1995).
29. Id. at 249; Andrea Stone, Jewish Teen Stands Against Utah Choir’s Christian
Tone, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 1995, at A4.
30. Stone, supra note 29, at A4.
31. The A’Cappella choir repertoire consisted of such Christian devotionals as “Friends,”
“The Lord Bless You and Keep You,” and “Advent Gift.” Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West
High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254, 259-61 (D. Utah 1995); Stone, supra note 29, at A4.
32. For example, the lyrics of “Advent Gift” are:
Lord, come to the manger, I wait for your birth;
Now come Savior Jesus and bless all the earth;
The heavens rejoice for your coming is nigh;
All glory and honor to You, Lord most high.
Stone, supra note 29, at A4. Another lyric proclaims, “We glorify thee, God of Hosts. We
love thee and exalt thee.” Bauchman II, 900 F. Supp. at 260.
33. Bauchman II, 900 F. Supp. at 260.
34. Id.
35. Id. For example, performances were held in The Church of the Madeleine (Roman
Catholic), the First Presbyterian Church, and Temple Square (The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints).
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beliefs upon his students and even encouraged them to visualize
“Jesus dying for our sins.”36
Rachel asked her father to write a letter to Torgerson request-
ing that he balance the choir’s repertoire by adding nonsectarian
songs and music of other faiths.37 She also asked that some of the
performances be held at nonreligious sites.38 Torgerson refused
both requests.39 Subsequently, he offered Rachel the choice of
continuing with the choir’s scheduled practices and performances
or sitting in the library for the duration of the Christmas con-
certs, for which she would earn an “A” for the course.40 Rachel’s
religious convictions prevented her from accepting the first of
Torgerson’s offers; her sense of honor required her to decline the
second.41
The situation worsened during the spring semester. Tradi-
tionally, the choir conducted a “spring tour” during which it per-
formed religious and devotional music.42 The choir frequently
participated as a group in Christian church services.43 During
class, Torgerson explicitly criticized Rachel’s opposition to the
content and locations of the spring tour.44 Subsequently, Torger-
son canceled the tour and indicated to the class that Rachel was
the cause.45 He chastised her in class for asserting her First
Amendment rights, repeatedly mentioning Judaism in such a
way as to differentiate her from her classmates.46 Rachel alleged
that “following the lectures she was exposed to public ridicule and
humiliation, and was the subject of racial and religious epithets
spoken by her fellow students.”47 For the remainder of the school
year, Rachel was subjected to hostility, anti-Semitic remarks, a
locker defaced by swastikas, and other hostile actions by West
High School students.48
                                                                                                             
36. William Raspberry, Avoidable Ugliness, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1995, at A17; see
also Samuel A. Autman, Bauchman Refiles West High Civil Rights Suit; It Includes State-
ments from Ex-Students on Actions of Choirmaster, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Sept. 27, 1995,
at D2.
37. Stone, supra note 29, at A4.
38. Bauchman II, 900 F. Supp. at 260.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 248, 249 (D.
Utah 1995).
42. Bauchman II, 900 F. Supp. at 260.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 260-61.
47. Id. at 261.
48. Stone, supra at 29, at A4. “She was called ‘Dirty Jew’ by other students. She was
told to ‘go back to Israel.’ Swastikas and ‘Jew Bitch’ were scrawled on her student govern-
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Rachel’s father wrote a private letter to Torgerson regarding
his daughter’s situation.49 Torgerson released the letter to Pre-
ston Naylor, the father of another student in the choir.50 Naylor
then circulated the letter to all of the parents of the students in
the choir.51 Rachel alleged that the release and circulation of her
father’s letter increased her public humiliation and the hostility
directed against her.52 Torgerson stated in class that he would not
stop his activities “no matter what”—even if Rachel believed they
were unconstitutional.53
The situation culminated at the high school graduation on
June 7, 1995. Attendance was compulsory for all students.54 The
A’Cappella Choir was slated to perform two songs: “Friends”
and “The Lord Bless You and Keep You.”55 The lyrics in both
songs explicitly referred to “the Lord” and to other words with
clear religious connotations.56 Rachel sued, seeking a temporary
restraining order, which was denied by U.S. District Court
Judge J. Thomas Greene.57 That denial was immediately over-
ruled by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.58 The
Tenth Circuit enjoined the choir from singing, and also enjoined
public school officials from allowing the singing of those two
particular songs at the graduation.59 Notwithstanding the in-
junction, a large majority of the students and parents in atten-
dance sang “Friends.”60
                                                                                                             
ment campaign posters. Now she is afraid to walk the hallways alone.” Id.; see also Kristen
Moulton, Choir’s Christian Tunes Sound a Note of Discord in Salt Lake City Rights: Despite
Injunction, Class Sang Religious Song at Graduation, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, at 4.
49. Bauchman II, 900 F. Supp. at 261.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Laurie Goodstein, School Prayer Directive May Not Settle All Cases: Many Relig-
ious Disputes Fall in Gray Zone, WASH. POST., July 15, 1995, at A1.
55. Raspberry, supra note 36, at A17.
56. Bauchman II, 900 F. Supp. at 261; see also Cal Thomas, Graduates Get Lesson in
Absurdity, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 14, 1995, at 11A:
The lyrics of “Friends” are, “Friends are friends forever if the Lord’s the Lord of
them.” “May the Lord Bless You and Keep You,” although deriving from the
Jewish Old Testament, carries with it a Christian connotation in its arrange-
ment and its frequent usage in Christian services. The lyrics are, “The Lord lift
up the light of the his countenance upon you and give you peace. . . . Amen.”
57. Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 248, 254 (D. Utah
1995).
58. Bauchman v. West High Sch., No. 95-4084 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1995).
59. Id.
60. Bauchman II, 900 F. Supp. at 261-62. It should be noted that Judge Greene ruled
against Rachel in her civil contempt action that claimed Torgerson and other public school
officials violated the injunction. Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 906 F.
Supp. 1483, 1494 (D. Utah 1995). That decision currently is on appeal in the Tenth Cir-
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Following this episode, Rachel brought suit in federal district
court against West High School, Torgerson, various public school
officials, and the Salt Lake City School District, alleging, among
other things, violations of her First Amendment rights.61 The dis-
trict court dismissed the suit, first in an oral opinion by Judge
Greene, and later, following supplemental pleadings, in a written
opinion.62 Remarkably, Greene ruled that Rachel had failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted, even though the
Tenth Circuit had earlier decided, based upon essentially the
same pleadings, that an injunction was appropriate.63
The point of this Article is not to debate the wisdom of Judge
Greene’s dismissal of Rachel’s suit. It does seem clear, however,
that Judge Greene will be reversed again on appeal. The Tenth
Circuit has stated that a dismissal for failure to state a claim is
proper “only when it appears ‘clear that no relief could be granted
under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the
allegations.’ ” 64 Rachel will undoubtedly get her day in court.
III.   THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN THE WARREN AND BURGER
COURT ERAS
Had Rachel’s claim arisen in the Warren Court era, or even in
the Burger Court era, contemporaneous constitutional jurispru-
dence would have revealed a clear violation of her First Amend-
ment rights. Engel v. Vitale65 and Abington School District v.
Schempp66 were the constitutional soil in which the Warren Court
rooted its perception of the separation of church and state. Both
Engel and Schempp focused on the issue of state-sponsored relig-
ious prayer in public schools.
                                                                                                             
cuit. See Jennifer Skordas, Ruling: Teachers Are Not to Blame Judge; West High Teachers
Not to Blame for Singing, School Officials Tried to Stop Religious Song, Ruled Not in Con-
tempt, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 28, 1995, at B1.
61. Bauchman II, 900 F. Supp. at 262. In addition to alleging violations of her rights
under the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amend-
ment, Rachel also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the same First
Amendment rights, as well as claims under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), and the Utah Constitution. 900 F. Supp. at 262.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 271-72.
64. Barett v. Tallon, 30 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
65. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
66. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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A.   Engel v. Vitale
Decided in 1962, Engel involved a New Hyde Park, New York,
school district directive that required every class in the district to
recite a state-created prayer in the presence of a teacher at the
beginning of each school day.67 The New York State Board of Re-
gents had recommended the nondenominational prayer as part of
its “Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools.”68
School district policy allowed those students who wished not to
participate the option of being excused upon the written request
of a parent or guardian.69 Furthermore, teachers could not man-
date any specific dress code, language, or posture during the
prayer session.70 Parents of ten students brought suit against the
school district, alleging that the prayer was contrary to their be-
liefs and violated the Establishment Clause.71 Finding that no
student was compelled to participate in the prayer, the New York
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the policy.72
In a decision written by Justice Black, the Supreme Court held
that the nondenominational prayer was unequivocally a religious
activity.73 Recognizing that state policy is unconstitutional when
it creates a government program furthering religion, the Court
found that the Establishment Clause “must at least mean that in
this country it is no part of the business of government to com-
pose official prayers for any group of the American people to re-
cite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.”74
The Court went on to explain that although a prayer may be de-
nominationally neutral and participation in its utterance volun-
tary, it is still an inappropriate advancement of religious goals by
the state and thus violates the Establishment Clause.75
The Establishment Clause is premised upon the “belief that a
union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion.”76 The Board of Regents’ policy was
therefore in direct conflict with the both the language and pur-
pose of the Establishment Clause. The government violates the
                                                                                                             
67. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422. The prayer read: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our de-
pendence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country.” Id.
68. Id. at 423.
69. Id. at 438 (Douglas, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 423.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 424-25.
74. Id. at 425.
75. Id. at 430.
76. Id. at 431.
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First Amendment not just when it promotes one religion over an-
other, but also when it infringes upon religious freedom, even to a
small degree.77
B.    Abington School District v. Schempp
The following year, in Abington School District v. Schempp, 78
the Supreme Court addressed the emotional and vexatious issue
of Judeo-Christian prayer in public schools. Schempp involved a
Pennsylvania statute that required the reading of ten verses from
the Bible at the beginning of each school day.79 As originally en-
acted, the statute did not have a provision for excusing stu-
dents.80 The statute was amended, allowing students with paren-
tal permission to be excused from the recitation and prayer ses-
sions.81
The school day at Abington High School began with a reading
over the intercom system of a student-selected passage from the
Bible.82 A recitation of the Lord’s Prayer followed the reading.83
The Schempps, who were Unitarians, sued the school district be-
cause they believed that other children would view the family’s
religious difference as “atheism,” which the Schempps felt would
stigmatize their children.84 The federal district court held that the
statute violated the Establishment Clause.85 In affirming, the Su-
preme Court noted that the Bible reading inherently possessed a
“devotional and religious character and constitute[d] in effect a
                                                                                                             
77. Id. at 436. James Madison, the author of the First Amendment, stated:
[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. . . . Who
does not see . . . . [t]hat the same authority which can force a citizen to contrib-
ute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment,
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
Id. (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
in 2 WRITINGS OF MADISON 183, 185-186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900)).
78. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
79. Id. at 205.
80. Id. at 206 n.1.
81. Id.
82. Readings came from many versions of the Bible, and the Jewish Holy Scriptures.
The school only offered the King James version of the Bible, which it gave to every teacher
in the district. Id. at 207.
83. Id. The Lord’s Prayer is:
Our Father which art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name.
Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven.
Give us this day our daily bread.
And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.
And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil: For thine is the
kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever. Amen.
Matthew 6:9-13 (King James).
84. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 208 n.3.
85. Id. at 206.
90 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:79
religious observance.”86 Furthermore, the fact that prayers were
said daily in a public school building under the supervision of
school personnel constituted an impermissible advancement of
religion by the state.87
The purpose of the Establishment Clause, declared the Court,
quoting Justice Rutledge’s seminal dissent in Everson v. Board of
Education,88 “ ‘was to create a complete and permanent separa-
tion of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by
comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support
for religion.’ ”89 Emphasizing the need for neutrality, the
Schempp Court stated that “while [the government] protects all,
it prefers none, and it disparages none.”90 This is the intent of the
Establishment Clause. If the purpose and primary effect of a
statute advances or inhibits religion, then it is constitutionally
infirm.
While the Abington Township School District contended that
the program had secular purposes and was voluntary, the
Schempp Court found that the pervasive religious character of
the exercises outweighed the school district’s arguments.91 The
Court understood that the seesaw effect of competing interests
within the First Amendment prohibits the use of government
power to deny the free exercise of religion to anyone. By the same
token, the First Amendment “has never meant that a majority
could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.”92
C.    Lemon v. Kurtzman
The Warren Court sowed the seeds of contemporary Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence in Engel and Schempp. The Bur-
ger Court reaped the harvest of church-state separation in 1971
when it created the bright line test that is synonymous with the
holding of Lemon v. Kurtzman .93 To pass muster under the
Lemon test, a government practice must (1) reflect a clearly
secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion, and (3) avoid excessive government entan-
                                                                                                             
86. Id. at 210.
87. Id.
88. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
89. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 217 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dis-
senting)).
90. 374 U.S. at 215 (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 224.
92. Id. at 226.
93. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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glement with religion.94 The Lemon test is the direct offspring of
Board of Education v. Allen 95 and Walz v. Tax Commission .96 The
Court obtained the first two prongs of the Lemon test from Allen, in
which the Court emphasized secular purpose and primary effect.97
The third prong, excessive government entanglement with religion,
derived from Walz.98
Lemon involved statutes enacted in Rhode Island99 and Penn-
sylvania.100 Each statute provided for public funding of secular
education in parochial schools. In Rhode Island, public funds
went to supplement the salaries of school teachers who taught
secular subjects in religious schools.101 In Pennsylvania, the stat-
ute authorized the state to purchase secular education classes
from religious schools through payment of public funds to those
schools for salaries and textbooks.102 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Burger analyzed the First Amendment’s use of the word
“respecting” and determined that the proper interpretation of this
word required the Court to strike down laws that are merely the
first step toward establishment of a state religion.103 Lemon
turned out to be the high water mark of separation of church and
state jurisprudence. Until recent years, the Lemon test was Es-
tablishment Clause gospel.104
                                                                                                             
94. Id. at 612.
95. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In Allen, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute that
required school districts to purchase and loan school textbooks, free of charge, to all stu-
dents in grades seven through twelve, including parochial, public, and private school at-
tendees. Id. at 238. Writing for the majority, Justice White concluded that the statute was
constitutional because it was not a “law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof.” Id. at 238.
96. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Walz, a property owner sought to enjoin the New York Tax
Commission from giving tax exemptions on real property wholly owned and used by relig-
ious organizations. Id. at 666. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Burger, found
that the statute did not attempt to establish, sponsor, or support religion. Id. at 673-74.
97. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 243).
98. Id. at 613.
99. Id. at 615 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 (1970)).
100. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620 (citing PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (1971)).
101. Id. at 607-08.
102. Id. at 609.
103. Id. at 612. Lemon actually turned upon the excessive entanglement prong derived
from Walz. See id. at 615.
104. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378,
392 (1990); Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 490 (1986);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 235 (1982).
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D.   Lower Court Application of the Lemon Test
Florey v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5 105 is one of Lemon’s
most significant progeny. The facts of Florey required the Eighth
Circuit to apply the Lemon test in its entirety to the question of
public school observance of religious holidays.106 In 1977, a kin-
dergarten class in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, held a Christmas
program.107 The program contained many Christian religious ref-
erences, including the now well-known “Beginners’ Christmas
Quiz.”108 Complaints from parents prompted the school board to
set up a citizens’ committee with members from a cross-section of
the community.109 The committee’s purpose was to study the re-
lationship between church and state and determine what was ap-
propriate for school functions.110
Several months of deliberations resulted in the creation of a set
of rules and a policy statement explaining the rules.111 Generally,
the rules limited observances to those holidays that had both a re-
ligious and secular basis. Holidays with only a religious basis
would not be observed.112 Rule 3 allowed music, art, literature, and
drama with a religious theme or basis to be included in the curricu-
lum if presented “in a prudent and objective manner and as a tra-
ditional part of the cultural and religious heritage of the particular
holiday.”113 Rule 4 permitted the use of religious symbols in teach-
ing only if they were used as an “example of the cultural and relig-
ious heritage of the holiday and [were] temporary in nature.”114
The district court held that the rules, “if properly administered
and narrowly construed,” would not violate the First Amend-
                                                                                                             
105. 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 1314.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1317. The “Christmas Quiz” contained many direct references to Christian
religious beliefs:
Teacher: Of whom did heavenly angels sing [a]nd news about His birthday
bring?
Class: Jesus.
. . . .
Teacher: What is the day we celebrate [a]s birthday of this One so great?
Class: Christmas.
Id. at 1318.
109. Id. at 1313. The committee consisted of parents, teachers, clergy of various relig-
ions, the school district’s music director, and an attorney. Id. at 1313 n.1.
110. Id. at 1313.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1314.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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ment.115 The Eighth Circuit applied the Lemon test to determine
whether the rules promulgated by the school board violated the
Establishment Clause.116 Using a step-by-step approach, the
Florey court analyzed each Lemon prong in detail. The court con-
sidered the first imperative—that “the [activity] must have a
secular purpose”117—in light of the school prayer cases.118 These
cases involved a state-created system that advanced religion.119
By contrast, the rules in Florey tried “to delineate the scope of
permissible activity.”120
The Florey court emphasized that the “purpose and effect” of
the rules was clearly secular.121 The school board policy attempted
to minimize the impact of religious holidays while trying to pre-
serve their cultural heritage.122 Even though a particular holiday
may have had a religious connotation, the rules promoted a
secular version of the holiday.123
Next, the Florey court applied the second Lemon prong to the
rules, asking whether they had a “ ‘principal or primary effect . . .
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.’ ”124 Again, the court
found no invalidity.125 The rules mandated that religious materi-
als, including art, music, and literature, be presented in the con-
text of the teaching of cultural history.126
The final prong was never really an issue because the facts in
Florey did not even approach “excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.”127 The court found that there was no mean-
ingful relationship between the school district’s policies and any
religious authority.128 Thus, Florey stands for the proposition that
the First Amendment does not insulate public schools from all
religious teaching.
                                                                                                             
115. Id. at 1313.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1314 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
118. See supra discussion part III.A-B.
119. “[W]hen a state intentionally sets up a system that by its essential nature serves
a religious function, one can only conclude that the advancement of religion is the desired
goal.” Florey, 619 F.2d at 1315.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1317.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1318.
128. Id.
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E.   The Burger Court’s Move Toward Accommodation
Toward the end of the Burger era, the Supreme Court began to
retreat from strict adherence to separation of church and state. In
terms of values, accommodation moved to the forefront.129 The
Court’s 1984 decision in Lynch v. Donnelly 130 exemplified this
shift. Lynch involved an annual Christmas display in a park in
Pawtucket, Rhode Island.131 Included in the display for the previ-
ous forty years were a Nativity scene, a Santa Claus house, rein-
deer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree,
carolers, cut-out figures such as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy
bear, hundreds of colored lights, and a banner reading “Seasons
Greetings,” among other things.132 In an opinion written by Chief
Justice Burger, the Court held that the use of the Nativity scene
in the context of a Christmas display did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because the government did not intend to aid
any particular religion or faith.133 The Court emphasized the im-
portance of viewing the government’s action in relation to the cir-
cumstances.134 In this case, the city had a secular purpose for in-
cluding the Nativity scene in its Christmas display.135 In the con-
text of the Christmas holiday, the Nativity scene neither ad-
vanced a religious cause nor created an excessive entanglement
between religion and government.136 The Court further stated
that any benefit received by a particular religion or faith was
“indirect, remote, and incidental.”137 The Court found that rather
than requiring complete separation of church and state, the Con-
stitution allowed for accommodation of all religions and pre-
vented hostility towards any. The Court went out of its way to
point out that “[a]nything less would require the ‘callous indiffer-
ence’ . . . that was never intended by the Establishment
Clause.”138
                                                                                                             
129. This fundamental change in policy is a direct reflection of Republican appoint-
ments to the Court. See Linda Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned to the Right, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 1989, at A1.
130. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
131. Id. at 671.
132. Id. at 671.
133. Id. at 685.
134. Id. at 680.
135. Id. at 681.
136. Id. at 681-82.
137. Id. at 683.
138. Id. at 673 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). The Court also
reasoned that “[t]o forbid the use of this one passive symbol at the very time hymns and
carols are sung and played in public places including schools, and while Congress and
state legislatures open public sessions with prayers, would be an overreaction contrary to
our history and to our holdings.” Id. at 686.
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IV.   THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN THE REHNQUIST COURT
A.   Dismantling the Wall
If the trend away from the separation of church and state was
a drizzle at the end of the Burger Court, it became a torrent in
the Rehnquist reign. Even in the most clear-cut cases, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia revealed that their personal
agenda was to emphasize the Free Exercise Clause at the ex-
pense of the Establishment Clause. For example, in the 1987 case
Edwards v. Aguillard ,139 Justices Rehnquist and Scalia were the
dissenters in the seven-to-two decision.140 Edwards involved a
Louisiana law which forbade the teaching of evolution in public
schools unless accompanied by instruction in the theory of
“creation science.”141 In an opinion written by Justice Brennan,
the Court held that the law served no identifiable secular purpose
and that its primary effect was the promotion of a particular re-
ligious belief, both of which violated the Establishment Clause.142
The Court reasoned that references to religion may be valid as
long as they do not have the purpose or effect of advancing relig-
ious goals.143 The Court also noted that younger students require
even more protection because the danger of influencing the be-
liefs of public grade school and high school children is so great.144
Fortunately, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia stood alone. Had they
carried the day in Edwards, there would have been little, if any,
protection left under the Establishment Clause.
The Rehnquist Court’s desire to dismantle the Establishment
Clause’s wall of separation between church and state became
clear in Bowen v. Kendrick .145 Bowen involved the constitutional-
ity of the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), which authorized
federal grants to secular and sectarian organizations for counsel-
ing and research in the areas of premarital adolescent relations
and teen pregnancy.146 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court in a five-to-four decision, ostensibly applied the Lemon test
                                                                                                             
139. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
140. Id. at 610 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
141. Id. at 581.
142. Id. at 594.
143. Id. at 584. A few examples of valid references would be the teaching of religion to
provide historical perspective, to illustrate comparative religious beliefs, or to highlight
religion in literature. Id. at 594.
144. Id. at 584 n.5.
145. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
146. Id. at 593.
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in holding that, on its face, AFLA did not have the “primary effect
of advancing religion.”147
Justice Blackmun, in a compelling dissent, asserted that
AFLA, unlike any statute this Court has upheld, pays for
teachers and counselors, employed by and subject to the direc-
tion of religious authorities, to educate impressionable young
minds on issues of religious moment. Time and again we have
recognized the difficulties inherent in asking even the best-
intentioned individuals in such positions to make a total sepa-
ration between secular teaching and religious doctrine.148
Continuing his assault on the majority’s form-over-substance ap-
proach, Justice Blackmun declared:
Whatever Congress had in mind, however, it enacted a stat-
ute that facilitated and, indeed, encouraged the use of public
funds for such instruction, by giving religious groups a central
pedagogical and counseling role without imposing any re-
straints on the sectarian quality of the participation. As the re-
cord develops thus far in this litigation makes all too clear, fed-
eral tax dollars appropriated for AFLA purposes have been
used, with government approval, to support religious teach-
ing.149
B.   Allegheny County: Accommodation Moves to the Forefront
The conservative ideology of accommodation, implicit in earlier
decisions,150 became explicit in County of Allegheny v. American
                                                                                                             
147. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
148. Id. at 638 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Accord Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 388 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977); Roemer v. Maryland
Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 749 (1976) (plurality opinion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 370 (1975); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,
481 (1973).
149. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 626 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For example, public funds
were used to pay for the following counseling:
You want to know the church teachings on sexuality. . . . You are the church.
You people sitting here are the body of Christ. The teachings of you and the
things you value are, in fact, the values of the Catholic Church.
. . . .
The Church has always taught that the marriage act, or intercourse, seals
the union of husband and wife, (and is a representation of their union on all
levels.) Christ commits Himself to us when we come to ask for the sacrament of
marriage. We ask Him to be active in our life. God is love. We ask Him to share
His love in ours, and God procreates with us, He enters into our physical union
with Him, and we begin new life.
Id. at 625 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Appendix to Petitioner‘s Brief at 226, 372).
150. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
113 (1985); (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Civil Liberties Union .151 This case involved the constitutionality
of two holiday displays in downtown Pittsburgh. The first display
was a Nativity scene placed inside the county courthouse.152 The
second was an eighteen-foot menorah placed outside the City-
County Building next to a forty-five-foot Christmas tree.153
This case was unusual in that four justices found that neither
display violated the Establishment Clause,154 three justices found
that both displays violated the Establishment Clause,155 and two
justices found that the Nativity scene was unconstitutional while
the menorah, in its context, was constitutional.156 The majority
distinguished the two displays by indicating that the Nativity
scene conveyed a religious message.157 The Court held that while
“[t]he government may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural
phenomenon . . . it may not observe it as a Christian holy day by
suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus.”158 Al-
though the menorah is the traditional symbol of Chanukah, the
Court reasoned that its placement next to a Christmas tree cre-
ated an “overall holiday setting” that mitigated the menorah’s
original nature, making it a symbol of the winter holiday season
and not a religious message of the Jewish faith.159
Justice Kennedy articulated the conservative view of accom-
modation in Allegheny County .160 With respect to the Nativity
scene, Justice Kennedy objected to the majority’s application of
the Lemon test; however, he purported to follow it himself.161
                                                                                                             
151. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
152. Id. at 578.
153. Id. at 587.
154. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia joined in Justice Kennedy’s opinion. See id.
155. Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens joined in Justice Brennan’s opinion. See id. Justice Stevens also wrote
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall joined. See id. at 646.
156. Id. at 621. Only Justice O’Connor joined part VII of Justice Blackmun’s opinion.
See id. at 578.
157. Id. at 600.
158. Id. at 601.
159. Id. at 614.
160. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). “The Religion
Clauses do not require government to acknowledge these holidays or their religious com-
ponent; but our strong tradition of government accommodation and acknowledgment
permits government to do so.” Id. at 664.
161. Id. at 655-56:
I am content for present purposes to remain within the Lemon framework, but
do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as our pri-
mary guide in this difficult area. . . . [But] even the Lemon test, when applied
with proper sensitivity to our traditions and our case law, supports the conclu-
sion that both the crèche and the menorah are permissible displays in the con-
text of the holiday season.
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Ironically, his application of the Lemon test would have severely
weakened the separation of church and state with the very stan-
dard that has most effectively maintained its preservation during
the past twenty years.
The real thrust of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, however, lay in
his use of the coercive effect test,162 which Justice O’Connor criti-
cized in her concurrence:
An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only
“coercive” practices or overt efforts at government proselytiza-
tion . . . but fails to take account of the numerous more subtle
ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs
or convey a message of disapproval to others, would not, in my
view, adequately protect the religious liberty or respect the re-
ligious diversity of the members of our pluralistic political
community. Thus, this Court has never relied on coercion alone
as the touchstone of Establishment Clause analysis.163
Drawing upon her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly ,164 Justice
O’Connor’s proposed solution was the endorsement test.165 In
Lynch, Justice O’Connor had described the Establishment
Clause’s protections as prohibiting the government from “making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing
in the political community.”166 The government violated this pro-
hibition when it endorsed a particular religion: “Endorsement
sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community.”167 Justice O’Connor’s thesis in Lynch
was that the relevant inquiry was not “whether secular objectives
for the legislation existed, but rather, whether the government
intend[ed] to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion or whether the message had such effect.”168 In Allegheny
County, Justice O’Connor explained that the test was the most
appropriate to apply in Establishment Clause cases because, “[a]s
a theoretical matter, [it] captures the essential command of the
Establishment Clause, namely, that government must not make
                                                                                                             
162. “[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or
its exercise.” Id. at 659.
163. Id. at 627-28 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
164. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
165. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 623 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
166. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 688.
168. Id. at 670-72.
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a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the
political community by conveying a message ‘that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.’ ”169
Thus, when the Allegheny County  dust had settled, three sepa-
rate Establishment Clause tests remained: the Lemon test, the
coercive effect test, and the endorsement test.170 In the context of
our country’s diversity and pluralism, in which constitutional
protections are so vital, the existence of three tests was a harbin-
ger of trouble.
C.   Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Fractured
Lee v. Weisman 171 involved a Providence, Rhode Island, school
district that invited a rabbi to give the invocation and benediction
at a graduation ceremony.172 It had been the long-standing policy
of the school district to invite members of the clergy to give such
addresses, as long as they followed the school district’s guidelines
and gave assurances that the prayers would be nonsectarian.173
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, used the coercive effect
test in holding that state-sponsored and directed religious exer-
cise amounted to an impermissible involvement of government
with religion.174 The Court reasoned that because the school dis-
trict provided the rabbi with a pamphlet on school policy and in-
structed him to deliver a nonsectarian message, they were in ef-
fect controlling the prayer’s content.175 The Court declared that
not only are actions or practices that coerce people to support or
participate in religious activities invalid, but those that even pose
the danger of doing so are likewise impermissible in light of the
Establishment Clause.176 Again, Justices Scalia, White, and Tho-
mas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented because of their be-
lief that the facts of Lee fit comfortably within the concept of ac-
                                                                                                             
169. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
170. Arguably, there was a fourth test: nonpreferential treatment. In his dissenting
opinion in Wallace, then-Justice Rehnquist found that the establishment of a national re-
ligion or the preference of a religious sect was forbidden by the Establishment Clause. 472
U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, he also found that programs that benefit
or prefer one religion without hindering another were constitutional. Id. (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
171. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
172. Id. at 581.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 587.
175. Id. at 588.
176. See id. at 592.
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commodation of religion by government.177 In retrospect, it is not
surprising that because of their accommodationist agenda these
four justices refused to concur in even the weakest of church-
state separation standards, the coercive effect test.178
The Rehnquist Court continued its expansion of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District .179
Zobrest concerned a hearing-impaired student who was attending
a private Roman Catholic school.180 Zobrest asked the school dis-
trict to furnish him with a sign language interpreter, but the
school district refused.181 In a five-to-four opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote that “[g]overnment programs that neutrally
provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without refer-
ence to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment
Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also re-
                                                                                                             
177. “[T]he Establishment Clause must be construed in light of the ‘[g]overnment poli-
cies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion [that] are an accepted
part of our political and cultural heritage.’ ” Id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
178. Even Professor Michael McConnell, an ardent supporter of accommodation and
free exercise, takes a very dim view of the Court’s current trend:
Until recently, the Free Exercise Clause was interpreted in a manner favorable
to accommodation, while the Establishment Clause was interpreted to create
obstacles to accommodation. . . . The current trend in the Court is the reverse:
The Free Exercise Clause no longer is interpreted to require accommodation in
most instances, but the Establishment Clause no longer is interpreted to inter-
fere with them, in most instances. This leads to a jurisprudence in which legis-
lative discretion is maximized and the Clauses, since they are rarely applied,
rarely conflict.
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Crit-
ics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 695-96 (1992).
179. 509 U.S. 1 (1993). The Rehnquist camp pressed strenuously to expand the Free
Exercise Clause in two later cases, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993), and Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District
v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
In Lamb’s Chapel, a school board denied a religious congregation the opportunity to use
school property for the viewing of a film because of the film’s religious nature. 508 U.S. at
386-87. The Court held that granting equal access to government property would not have
violated the Establishment Clause test under Lemon because the activity would not have
occurred during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would
have been open to the public. Id. at 395.
At issue in Kiryas Joel was a state law creating a separate school district for a com-
munity of Orthodox Jews. 114 S. Ct. at 2484. The Court held that it was not the fact
that the school district was comprised of solely one religious sect that violated the First
Amendment, but rather that the legislature had intentionally set the school district
lines in such a way as to accommodate one religious group. Id. at 2487. Notwithstand-
ing the blatant Establishment Clause violation, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissented, finding no constitutional infirmity. Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
180. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3.
181. Id. at 4.
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ceive an attenuated financial benefit.”182 The Court reasoned that
any aid the secular school received was indirect because the aid
attached to the individual child, and the parents had the choice to
send him to any school they wished.183
Again, Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion. “
‘Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized
by few absolutes,’ at a minimum ‘the Clause does absolutely pro-
hibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrina-
tion into the beliefs of a particular religious faith.’ ”184 Thus, in its
rush to restrict the protections of the Establishment Clause, the
Rehnquist majority in Zobrest embarked upon the dangerous
path of political decisionmaking.185 There was no need for the
Court to decide Zobrest on constitutional grounds. There were
two other, nonconstitutional grounds on which the Court properly
could have decided the case.186
The Court’s compulsion to expand the Free Exercise Clause
found its most recent expression in a five-to-four decision, Rosen-
berger v. Rector of the University of Virginia .187 In Rosenberger,
the Court upheld the payment of public funds to an evangelical
student organization devoted to religious proselytization.188
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated that
[t]hough our Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hope-
less disarray, this case provides an opportunity to reaffirm one
basic principle that has enjoyed an uncharacteristic degree of
consensus: The Clause does not compel the exclusion of relig-
ious groups from government benefits programs that are gen-
erally available to a broad class of participants.189
In a cogent dissent, Justice Souter asserted “[t]he Court today,
for the first time, approves direct funding of core religious activi-
ties by an arm of the State.”190 Justices Souter, Stevens, Gins-
burg, and Breyer viewed this as a clear violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause. Concluding his dissent with a reference to his
                                                                                                             
182. Id. at 8.
183. Id. at 12.
184. Id. at 21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
185. See generally Julian R. Kossow, Dolan v. City of Tigard, Takings Law and the Su-
preme Court: Throwing the Baby out with the Floodwater, 14 STAN. ENV. L. J. 215 (1995).
186. Zobrest, 508 U.S. at 15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“This Court could easily re-
frain from deciding the constitutional claim by vacating and remanding the case for con-
sideration of the statutory and regulatory issues.”).
187. 115 S. Ct 2510 (1995).
188. Id. at 2525.
189. Id. at 2532.
190. Id. at 2533.
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own apprehension about the future,191 Justice Souter recalled
Chief Justice Burger’s prophetic warning in Lemon: “ ‘[I]n consti-
tutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were thought
to approach “the verge” have become the platform for yet further
steps. A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and
it can be a “downhill thrust” easily set in motion but difficult to
retard or stop.’ ”192
V.   THE NEED TO RETURN TO THE LEMON BRIGHT LINE
To advocate a return to strict Lemon test adherence in the con-
text of a case involving lyrics in public high school choir songs
may appear to many readers to be “distant” and “early” rather
than a “warning.”193 However, the most delicate sensitivities are
involved in issues of separation of church and state.194 Perhaps
Rachel Bauchman will establish at trial that Torgerson’s activi-
ties amounted to outright proselytizing. If so, I trust that all
members of the present Court would find such conduct offensive
to the Constitution. Indeed, past cases have so held.195
The more difficult question arises when a plaintiff cannot show
proselytizing by public school teachers and the legal focus nar-
rows solely to the lyrics of choir songs and their places of per-
formance. A strong argument can be made that cultural, historic,
and artistic aspects inherent in music outweigh, in a constitu-
tional sense, the music’s explicit religious content. However, this
argument would only be persuasive if the music itself were part
of a nonsectarian curriculum of public education presented in the
same way that algebra or any other course were taught.196 Thus,
Rachel’s case brings us to the precise intersection of the Lemon
test and the Establishment Clause. Taking into account the total-
ity of Torgerson’s actions, three questions need to be asked: first,
did the government’s practice reflect a clearly secular purpose? 197
Second, did the government’s practice have a primary effect that
neither advanced nor inhibited religion?198 Finally, did the gov-
                                                                                                             
191. Id. at 2550.
192. Id. at 2551 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971)).
193. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
195. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625; Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 444
(1962).
196. See Doe v. Duncanville Ind. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 407 (1995).
197. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
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ernment’s practice avoid excessive entanglement with religion?199
My answers are no, no, and no.
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, Doe v. Duncanville Indepen d-
ent School District ,200 not only sheds light on the answers but also
bears a striking similarity to the Rachel Bauchman case.201 Dun-
canville involved a twelve-year-old girl who had qualified to play
on the school’s basketball team.202 She was part of a physical edu-
cation class specifically designed for members of the basketball
team.203 In addition to the basketball team, Doe also joined the
choir. She received academic credit for both activities.204
The basketball team activities that were of questionable relig-
ious character included the coach’s recitation of the Lord’s Prayer
at practices, games, and on the bus traveling to away games.205
While Doe was a member of the choral program, she was required
to sing the choir’s theme songs, “The Lord Bless You and Keep
You” and “Go Ye Now in Peace.”206 Not wanting to single herself
out, Doe took part in these programs.207 However, after discussing
it with her father, she realized that she was not required to par-
ticipate and opted out of the prayers.208 Unfortunately, her non-
participation drew attention from spectators and her fellow stu-
dents, who singled her out and questioned her beliefs.209
The Fifth Circuit held that the school district’s practice of allow-
ing its employees to participate in and/or supervise student prayers
during basketball practices and games violated the Establishment
Clause.210 However, the court found that the school district’s prac-
tice of allowing the choir to use Christian religious songs as its
theme songs did not violate the Establishment Clause.211 The court
acknowledged that “the principle that government may accommo-
date the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamen-
tal limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.”212 In holding
that the prayers at basketball practices and games violated the Es-
tablishment Clause, the court stated:
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This is particularly true in the instant context of basketball
practices and games. The challenged prayers take place during
school-controlled, curriculum-related activities that members of
the basketball team are required to attend. During these ac-
tivities DISD coaches and other school employees are present
as representatives of the school and their actions are represen-
tative of DISD policies.213
As for the choir’s theme songs, the court held that “[r]eligious
songs may be sung, however, for their artistic and historic quali-
ties if presented objectively as part of a secular program of edu-
cation.”214 Thus, Duncanville turns on the objective presentation
of the choir’s songs.215
The facts of Rachel’s case appear to demand a different result.
Torgerson’s actions violated the first prong of the Lemon test be-
cause they did not clearly reflect a secular purpose. The choir’s
repertoire consisted solely of Christian songs, and Torgerson re-
fused any attempt to balance the choir’s program.216 Furthermore,
this was not an isolated incident. Many of Torgerson’s former
students voiced concerns similar to those expressed by Rachel.217
In addition, the choir performed concerts at various community
churches, where it participated in Christian religious services.218
As to the second part of the Lemon test, the primary effect of
Torgerson’s directing of the choir was a blend of music for music’s
sake and an advancement of the teacher’s own religion, as well as
an inhibition of Rachel’s religion. During his choir class, Torger-
son repeatedly pressed his religious beliefs on his students,
preaching that “Jesus d[ied] for our sins.”219 He also publicly em-
phasized Rachel’s religious beliefs, stimulating anti-Semitic re-
sponses from her peers.220 The totality of these circumstances
fails to satisfy the second requirement of the Lemon test.
With respect to the third prong of the Lemon test, the whole
process reflected an excessive entanglement with religion. The
choir’s extensive religious repertoire, its participation in religious
services, and the choir director’s steadfast stance against any
secularization of the curriculum so entangled this public school
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with religion as to pressure Rachel’s minority beliefs. Such ac-
tions threaten suffocation of the concept of religious freedom.
VI.   CONCLUSION
A rigorous application of the Lemon test would show that Ra-
chel’s First Amendment rights have been violated. From a policy
perspective, this finding would be an appropriate result. Separa-
tion of church and state must once again become a judicial prior-
ity. The Rehnquist Court’s thrust toward accommodation of relig-
ion is simply too threatening to the millions of Americans who do
not follow the majority’s creed.221 The wall of separation envi-
sioned by our founders and made explicit in the Establishment
Clause222 may crumble under the weight of too many decisions
like Bowen,223 Zobrest,224 and Rosenberger.225 The majority of
Americans, including the orthodox and the fundamentalist, are
free—truly free—to practice their beliefs, but those beliefs should
not be foisted upon Americans of a different faith or of no faith.
Only the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment
stands in the way.
                                                                                                             
221. Professor Nadine Strossen, president of the American Civil Liberties Union,
stated in a recent symposium on the topic of religion in schools:
By the same token, for those who are non-religious, or who follow different re-
ligious traditions from those assertedly embraced in school-sponsored prayer,
the exercise is equally problematic, because, as Justice O’Connor stated . . . it
signals to them that they are only second-class citizens. . . . The adverse impact
of government-endorsed religious exercises upon those who do not share the
beliefs advanced is not just a matter of abstract constitutional theory. Its tan-
gible damage is demonstrated by Deborah Weisman’s experience. The most
common question she got about her case . . . is: “Why make such a big deal out
of a small prayer?” Here is Deborah’s answer to that question, speaking from
her own experience as a public school student: “I don’t think a little prayer is a
small thing. It excludes. They forced me to pray to someone else’s God. That is
a big deal . . . When I am forced to participate in a ritual . . . it’s an attempt to
make me different from what I am—to change my identity, to make me con-
form.”
Nadine Strossen, How Much God in the Schools? A Discussion of Religion’s Role in the
Classroom, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 607, 623 (1995) (quoting telephone interview with
Deborah Weisman (Sept. 6, 1995)).
222. See supra note 2.
223. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
224. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
225. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
